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21 Introduction
The traditional strategy in India of improving nancial inclusion was through
intensive government intervention in banking. After a half-century of appli-
cation of such policies failed to deliver satisfactory results, it has become
increasingly clear that this approach has many limitations. In recent years, a
fascinating new phenomenon has come about: a dramatic growth of lending
to the poor over the last decade through a new channel of for-prot micro -
nance institutions. These rms tap into equity capital in the formal nancial
system, and the priority sector lending requirements of Indian banks. They
deliver loans to households from the 80th to the 60th decile in the distribu-
tion of household income, delivering credit to households where, previously,
bank loans were essentially non-existent.
Globally as well as in India, the rise of this new micro nance industry
has made some observers uncomfortable because prots were being made by
serving the poor. There was discomfort when some of these rms listed with
high valuations, such as the the IPO of SKS Micronance in India. The role
of priority sector lending, at the foundation of the business model of these
rms, was also a source of criticism.
This period of high growth came to a halt in India, with the Second Micro
Finance Crisis in Andhra Pradesh (October to December 2010). Concerns
about the violation of the rights of micro-borrowers led to an intervention by
the State government1, which has caused the collapse of the micro nance
industry, both in Andhra Pradesh, as well as in the rest of the country.
A lot has been written about the structure, the growth and the problems of
the micro-nance industry in India (Kaladhar, 1997; Nair, 2001; Basu and
Srivastava, 2005; Chakrabarti, 2005). These developments, in India, mirror
the development of this industry worldwide (Arun and Hulme, 2008). Recent
work in this eld includes Sane and Thomas (2010) and Shankar and Asher
(2010).
After the Second Micro Finance Crisis unfolded, the Reserve Bank of India
created an expert committee, chaired by Y. H. Malegam, which proposed a
regulatory framework primarily for micro-nance rms that are registered as
non-banking nance companies, or NBFCs (Malegam, 2011).
Shortly after that, the Department of Financial Services in the Ministry of
1See State Government of Andhra Pradesh (2010) for the Ordinance passed by the
Andhra Pradesh government.
3Finance proposed a `Micro Finance Institutions (Development & Regulation)
Bill, 2011' (Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance, 2011).
The purpose of this paper is to carefully analyse this draft Bill from a legal
and economic policy perspective.
Several areas of concern are identied. The Bill has a lack of clarity of ob-
jectives. There is insucient focus in the Bill on how to address the problem
of protecting the rights of the consumer of nancial services and products,
particularly, the micro-borrower. The Bill shows a lack of clarity on the def-
inition of thrift and how it is distinct from deposit-taking. This in turn leads
to a lack of clarity on how micro nance institution regulation is dierent
from banking regulation. The Bill proposes regulatory responsibility among
various entities which leads to a lack of clear responsibility of regulatory
responsibilities, and accountability for these. The Bill does not provide su-
cient clarity on the amount and sources for nancing of regulatory functions.
The Bill also raises concerns on issues of rule of law, as well as on the con-
stitutional issues of the powers of the Centre versus the State Government.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is a brief description of the Bill
itself. Section 3 lists the broad areas of concerns to be addressed for the Bill
to be eective, and presents a short analysis of why these need to be resolved
urgently. Sections 4 to 7 oers a more detailed analysis of some of these
issues. Section 8 concludes. Finally, the appendix presents a detailed legal
review of the Bill.
2 An overview of the Bill
In a nutshell, this Bill views micro nance institutions as `extended arms of
banks and nancial services'. It proposes to: (a) Create advisory councils
to guide the development of the industry, (b) Place registration and micro-
prudential regulatory functions upon the rbi and (c) Create a new redressal
mechanism for handling consumer grievances.
The preamble introduces the purpose of the Bill as providing access to nan-
cial services for the rural and urban poor and similar disadvantaged sections
of the people through micro nance institutions. These institutions are pro-
posed as \extended arms of the banks and nancial services". The Bill also
proposes to provide on matters connected to the micro-nance institutions
including regulation.
The 35-page Bill covers three broad topics :
41. The creation of advisory councils to guide the development of the pro-
posed industry of micro nance institutions (Chapters II to Chapter
III, from the bottom of page 4 to page 7),
2. The denition of a framework for registration, micro-prudential regula-
tion, and delegation of powers to the Reserve Bank of India (Chapters
IV to Chapter VI where two Chapters have been numbered IV, from the
bottom of page 7 to page 24, followed by a framework of action to be
taken against micro nance institutions under conditions of misdeed
or default, and further delegation of powers to the Reserve Bank and
various other agencies Chapter VIII to Chapter X, from page 25 to page
35).
3. Lastly, matters pertaining to the rights and protection of the customer
of the micro-nance institutions through a redressal mechanism (Chap-
ter VII, page 25).
3 Areas of concern
A careful analysis of the Bill reveals broad concerns that need to be urgently
resolved. This is based on a clause-by-clause analysis of the Bill from a
legal point of view, which is presented in Appendix A. The legal analysis
reveals some recurrent themes, which are then culled into the following core
concerns:
Missing clarity of objectives The Bill is not motivated by clear objec-
tives. The existing draft Bill does not provide concrete reasons for
why there is a need to regulate the micro-nance industry, which to-
day largely provides credit services similar to those found in banking.
Thus, the question of What is the problem regulation is trying to solve?
remains unanswered. Problems that the Bill was proposed to resolve,
such as issues of consumer protection and problems in the credit pro-
cesses for micro-borrowers that was identied in the Andhra Pradesh
crisis, have not received the focus they merit.
Similarity to Banking There is not enough discussion on the objective
of allowing micro-nance companies to carry out functions similar to
banking, while giving them the right to collect thrift from micro-savers
and micro-borrowers.
Multiple regulators, conicts and costs The Bill is generally vague and
5provides for vast, unchecked and undened powers to make regulation,
which amounts to excessive delegation. It results in the creation of
multiple regulators for the same functions, which in turn, creates over-
laps in their functioning. The Bill also creates potential conicts of
interest by making the many regulators also owners or investors in the
business of micro-nance. The Bill is not nancially sound. A large
part of the nancial burden on the regulator cannot be borne from the
fees collected under this bill.
Appeals process The Bill does not provide an adequate appeals mecha-
nism to either the micro-nance companies or their customers, thereby
diluting the standard of rule of law expected from Indian legislation.
Constitutional issues The Bill tries to oust the jurisdiction of the state
governments over money lending activities and undermines the federal
structure of the Constitution.
4 Missing Clarity on Regulatory Objectives
At a strategic level, all nancial regulation can be classied into the areas of
consumer protection, prudential regulation or systemic risk regulation. Each
piece of nancial regulation needs to be associated with the rationale about
the market failure that motivates either or all three branches of regulation.
An analysis of the micro-nance crisis and collective experience from nancial
regulation suggests that regulation ought to have following broad focus:
1. Protect the rights of the micro-nance consumer with a primary focus
on ensuring quality of nancial services distribution.
2. Monitor and supervise the level of disclosure by micro-nance compa-
nies to ensure transparency about the risks in the micro-credit portfo-
lios. This would assist funding agencies make informed decisions.
3. Promote the development of the sector by innovations in
(a) Linkages between customer and micro-nance institution, creating
an enabling framework where all types of nancial services can
reach those who are not nancially included.
(b) Linkages between funding agency and micro-nance institution,
creating an enabling framework for all types of formal nancial
companies to fund micro-nance activities, not just banks.
6However, the Bill does not seem predicated on any clear objectives. If the
aim is to make micro-nance institutions an extended arm of the banking
system as the Bill says it ought to be, why not consider giving them Business
Correspondent licenses as an approach with a similar goal, but which has the
advantage of superior regulatory clarity?
4.1 Missing clarity on Consumer Credit Processes
Consumer credit,2 in general, and micro-credit, in particular, suer from
some lacunae that require regulatory intervention. These include:
1. Lack of clarity on features of the credit products such as interest rates,
and bundled insurance.
2. Over borrowing by consumers.
3. Being denied credit without adequate reason.
4. Lack of clarity on procedures related to early repayment, debt restruc-
turing, bankruptcy, debt collection practices. These are issues are
particularly troublesome to resolve in the context of the joint-liability
structure under which almost all of the micro-credit business has de-
veloped.
There is need for a credit bill to address these areas such that the rules
governing the act of lending stay the same regardless of the entity, loan
amount and purpose of the loan.3
The issues listed above are precisely some of the problems that the Micro-
nance Bill was proposed to solve, and get little attention in the current draft
of the Bill. If the Bill needs to justify its existence other than a modied
version of Banking regulation, it ought to adequately address all of the above
issues.
2We dene consumer credit as credit taken by individuals and not by companies. The
credit may be taken for productive purposes or for consumption.
3For example, South Africa established the \National Credit Regulator" to carry
out education, research, policy development, registration of industry participants, in-
vestigation of complaints, and ensuring enforcement of the National Credit Act. http:
//www.ncr.org.za/ Australia has also announced a program of \National Credit Reform"
(The Treasury of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2010).
74.2 Missing clarity on Customer Protection
The Bill provides for the RBI to set up as many Micro-Finance Ombudsmen
as it may deem t in accordance with a scheme framed under Section 31,
for the purpose of redressal of grievances between clients of micro-nance
institutions and micro-nance institutions with powers to issue directions to
micro-nance institutions. There are two problems with this.
First, it is not clear that an Ombudsman model is the correct model to solve
individual disputes between the customer and micro-nance agency. This is
because the role of the Ombudsman is often to investigate problems from the
point of view of the system so as to provide a process correction mechanism,
and not to provide dispute resolution for individual complaints.
Second, even if the Ombudsman serves as a dispute resolution agency, it is not
clear from where the Ombudsman gets the power to initiate legal proceedings
on the grounds of a complaint. The current Bill does not provide for it.
There needs to be greater clarity on the legal framework that will empower
the Ombudsman to act as a dispute resolution agency.4
5 Similarity to Banking
From reading the whole bill, it can be inferred that micro-nance companies
will be allowed to collect deposits, in the form of what has been named thrift
under the Bill. Thrift has been very loosely dened. The Bill does not oer
much clarity on how such deposits are dierent from banking deposits, or
how these will be used by the micro-nance companies. This is an especially
dangerous trend for a number of reasons:
1. Such a provision eectively makes the micro-nance company, a bank-
ing institution.
Even if thrift deposits are not on demand deposits,5 there are asset
liability mismatches that could arise due to dierence in maturities of
the deposits and loans. Also, the loans in the micro-nance industry
carry higher credit risk than that of the normal banking system. This is
reected in the higher interest rate that is charged by the micro-nance
4Examples of active nancial sector Ombudsmen agencies include the Financial Om-
budsman Service in the UK (http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/) and the
Credit Ombudsman Service in Australia (http://www.cosl.com.au/).
5These are dened as deposits on which cheques can be written.
8companies. If the poor (who the micro-nance industry is supposed to
serve) have to put their savings in such high risk activity, the systemic
risk is increased. Any event which causes a large number of poor debtors
to default, will wipe out the savings of a similar (or even larger) number
of depositors. The government should clearly decide whether it wishes
the poor to nance the micro-nance industry through their savings.
2. A bill which allows nancial institutions to carry out banking-like ac-
tivity would create signicant regulatory arbitrage. Banks could lose
customers if there is higher regulatory burden placed under the Bank-
ing Regulation Act. The only solution for the regulator then would be
to equalise the Banking Regulation Act and the Bill. This would be a
very dicult task.
6 Multiple Regulators, Conicts and Costs
There is a need in the Bill to dierentiate the functions of all the regulators
involved, which includes the Central Government, the Reserve Bank of India
(RBI), National Bank, the Micro-Finance Development Councils and the
State Advisory Councils. It seems there has been not much thought as why
so many regulators are required in the rst place.
In addition, the interaction of the regulators seems to be incorrect. While the
RBI is seen as the primary regulator of the industry, the Councils are respon-
sible for advising the Central and State Governments. The National Bank
for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) has been provided no
primary role in the Bill, but the RBI may delegate its powers and responsibil-
ity to NABARD if it chooses to. This reects poor policy where the parent
legislation is not even able to identify the regulator to delegate responsibility
to. It also creates a situation where, due to overlapping jurisdictions, every
regulator will be of the opinion that the function is the duty of the other
regulator. This could lead to large regulatory gaps or contradictions.
The Bill also proposes a fund from the fees collected from the micro-nance
companies to be used for funding of such institutions through both equity
and debt. This, according to the Bill, should be collected by the RBI. The
conicts arising out of owning and regulating the same business is both inter-
nationally and domestically well established. When the regulator has com-
mercial interests in a rm it typically loathes to take regulatory action against
such companies which may cause loss. In the worse case, the regulator may
9design regulations in such a way that companies, in which it invests, enjoys
benets which other companies do not. The Bill undoes several steps the gov-
ernment has taken to remove such conicts in nancial regulation through
separation of the regulator and ownership in the public sector banking in-
dustry.
There is no provision for an analysis of the nancial impact of this bill on the
government or the RBI. The complex regulatory structure with three poten-
tial regulators and two advisory bodies will be expensive to run. Moreover,
the users of micro-nance services are usually poor households who do not
have information about, or access to, legal remedies. This would imply that
the regulator would have to take a proactive role by employing more sta and
carrying out frequent investigations. However, no salaries for sta of such
regulators may be paid out of the fees collected. Such fees are predominantly
designed to provide for nancial assistance and investments in micro-nance
companies. This would mean that the micro-nance companies will be able
to channel back the fees they paid into their own companies leaving less
funds for the regulators to pursue the violators. Such a nancial organisa-
tion would severely cripple the functioning of the regulator due to shortage
of funds. Tax payers would then be left to pay for the costs of regulation, or
suer huge losses due to persistent failures in the micro-nance industry.
7 Appeals and Rule of Law
The provision on criminal actions in the Bill have been very poorly drafted.
It makes violation of every Section, rule, regulation or orders to be a crim-
inal oence. On the other hand, the consumers have no recourse in civil or
criminal courts without the permission of the RBI. The courts to try oences
have also been raised to Judicial Magistrate, rst class. This creates a situ-
ation where the end consumers have very few legal remedies if the regulator
does not act. This is against the general principle that a person who has
been harmed by an action has the right to approach the court to get justice.
There is a need to empower the consumers in the micro-nance industry, not
take away their right to approach courts.
The conditions of appeals for the micro-nance companies have been severely
limited as well. There is no clear route from the regulator to the writ courts.
Moreover, the rst appellate authority is the Central Government, which is an
executive wing and does not have judicial expertise. The Bill does not provide
for how the Central Government will organise the appellate mechanism.
108 Conclusion
Micro-nance in India has faced a crisis in Andhra Pradesh. At this stage, the
policy response should involve a careful diagnosis of the sources of this crisis,
which should then lead to a commensurate response to resolve problems.
This can be done using the tools of nancial regulation, which are:
1. Consumer protection
2. Prudential regulation
3. Systemic risk regulation.
The complaints against micro-nance institutions in India revolve around
issues of predatory lending and unfair debt collection practices. Additional
problems include high interest rates charged on, and mis-selling of, micro
credit products.
Any policy response, such as regulation, should therefore concentrate rst on
the protection of the borrower from the distribution practices of the micro-
nance institutions, rather than focus on prudential regulation, which has
been the focus of most of the discussion in India.
Regulation also has an important role to play in facilitating funds ow to
the micro-nance lending business. Policy needs to facilitate information
sharing both between nancial institutions and micro-nance institutions,
and between micro-nance institutions themselves, about borrower quality,
so that decisions are made on a base of trust that is not vulnerable to the
vagaries of public opinion or of political economy.
If the broad aim of the Bill is to allow micro-nance institutions to act as
banks, then there needs to be greater debate on the implications of this on
both institutional and governance structures required of any deposit-taking
institutions, and on lender and borrower protection, as poor customers will
simultaneously be lenders to and borrowers from the micro-nance institu-
tions.
In addition, the Bill can be strengthened through a careful examination
rooted in the principles of nancial economics, principles of public adminis-
tration and principles of rule of law.
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12A Detailed legal review of the Bill
This section of the document analyses specic provisions by quoting parts
from the Bill. The objective is to analyse the Bill from a legal perspective,
so as to identify areas which could create problems of litigation in the future.
The following are a list of specic aspects of the Bill which has to be resolved
explicitly.
Preamble ... growth and development of micro nance institu-
tions as extended arms of the banks ...
It is unclear whether this implies that Micro-Finance Institutions (mfis)
will be restricted to get funds only from banks and other nancial in-
stitutes. This raises the following questions: Is it possible for an mfi
to use equity funding (both private and public) for business? Does this
imply that mfis will also be owned by banks and nancial institutions,
and therefore, cannot be considered a separate industry? This is con-
trary to the real-world experience where micro-nance has grown to be
an industry of its own.
Preamble ... nancial services to the poor households and their
micro enterprises as an extended arm of the banking system;
The essential feature of a banking system is in taking deposits and
making advances against those deposits. Banking laws prohibit any
other business from carry out the business of banking. The sentence
above implies that micro-nance will act as an extended arm of the
banking system. Therefore, does the above denition imply that mfis
will carry out the essential feature of banking system?
This is a problematic issue because this would end up creating a parallel
banking industry without the explicit protection and regulatory burden
of the normal banking industry. This has the potential of creating the
risk of asset liability mismatches within the micro-nance industry. It
would also cause signicant damage to the banking industry due to
regulatory arbitrage.
Preamble thereby to facilitate universal access to integrated -
nancial services for the unbanked population.
If the mfi is to provide all nancial services, it should be explicitly
regulated for all such nancial services. This contradicts the previous
statement that it is an extended arm of the banking system.
13Further, it raises the following questions: Does the above imply that
an mfi is required to provide all nancial services? What about hybrid
services or non-nancial services? For example, can an mfi provide a
gold loan, or reverse mortgage, or some nancial service not otherwise
provided to rich who are not customers of the mfi? Can the mfi
provide products or services like fertiliser or health on credit? Would
such services be prohibited because they are not what is considered
nancial services today?
If these questions are not explicitly resolved, the Bill could lead to
stagnation in the innovation by the micro-nance industry, rather than
facilitate development.
Section 2.(d) \nancial assistance" means any loan, advance,
grant or any guarantee given or any other credit facility ex-
tended in cash or kind with or without security or guarantee;
The term nancial assistance has multiple associated problems:
1. Financial assistance implies a charitable nature in the business
of micro-nance. This militates against the possibility of micro-
nance companies which are for-prot. This also implies that the
consumers of micro-nance are those who require assistance rather
than become viable credit customers.
2. The denition of the term does not, in any way, clarify the term
or provide any legal test of what is, and what is not, nancial
assistance. Loan and advance imply a commercial transaction.
While loan is nancial in nature, advance may not be.
For example, organisations may provide money in advance for ser-
vices or products at a later date. The term grant denotes an en-
dowment from which no return is expected. Does this then imply
that organisations providing charity would also come under the
ambit of this bill? Many a number of times, guarantee is provided
with our without consideration. Guarantees may be provided out
of long standing business relationship as well.
3. The denition provides that the loan, advance, grant may be in
cash or in kind. This could cover all non nancial transactions
as well. Even repayments in kind would also be covered in this
denition.
For example, a shop providing fertiliser for payment at a later
time would be considered a nancial assistance.
144. This denition in its ambit covers almost all transactions, where
either a payment or delivery of service or goods is made at dierent
points of time.
For example, a forwards contract would also be covered under
this denition. In fact, there is almost no transaction imaginable
which is not covered under this denition.
The objective of a legal denition should be to provide certainty.
It should clearly dene the boundaries of the transaction it seeks
to cover thereby informing all what are the actions it does not seek
to cover. Denitions like these do not provide any information at
all for the lawyer, judge, and endows the regulator with unlimited/
absolute power.
Section 2.(e) ... the cost of funds raised and other operational
costs incurred by the micro nance institution ...
Costs of funds raised is easy to determine if the funds are raised through
debt. It is very dicult to determine in the case of equity. When micro-
nance business is funded through equity (from both private and public
sources of equity), it will be nearly impossible to determine. Private
equity investors may have high expectations on returns which may not
be unjustied in the risky nature of the advances made by mfis.
Section 2.(f),(g) Denition of micro nance institution and Mi-
cro nance services.
The denition of micro-nance institution is dependent on the deni-
tion of micro-nance services. This would not have been a problem
if micro-nance services had an unambiguous denition, which is not
the case. Micro-nance services have been dened as providing ser-
vices with small value. The problem with this denition is that it does
not exclude a normal nancial services company providing small ticket
services.
For example, if the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) were to
launch a small ticket insurance service, a reading of the two aforemen-
tioned denitions would make LIC an mfi.
Section 2.(g) remittance of funds
The entry remittance of funds is not readily dierentiable from trans-
fer of funds. The activity of funds transfer are regulated under the
Payments and Settlement Systems Act of 2007. This could have two
15probable outcomes for the micro-nance industry: (a) The mfi would
fall between two regulators and the regulatory contradictions would
make the business unviable, or (b) The mfi would enjoy regulatory
arbitrage, thereby undermining the objectives of the Payments and
Settlement Systems Act.
Section 2.(o) Systemically important micro nance institution
The denition of systemically important micro-nance institution has
been left entirely to the regulator. There is no direction as to what are
the criteria for a systemically important mfi can be. There is no process
mentioned on the adjudication of such mfis. There is no objective for
regulation of systemically important mfis.
Such a system would be prone to creating extra regulatory burden on
such mfis making them non-competitive.
Section2.(p) from members of self-help groups or any other group
of individuals by whatever name called
There is a contradiction between the denition of thrift and the deni-
tion of micro-nance services under section 2(g). The denition under
Section 2(g) refers to the collection of thrift from individuals or groups,
implying that thrift could be collected from a single person.
The denition under Section 2(p) of thrift, on the other hand, states
that thrift is deposit collected from members of self-help groups or any
other group of individuals. This implies that thrift collection can be
done only if the contributor is a member of a self-help group. This raises
the following question: Can thrift can be collected from an individual
or not?
Section 3 ... growth and development of the micro nance sector
and micro nance institutions, to promote nancial inclu-
sion.
There is no denition of the term nancial inclusion. This is an im-
portant lacunae in the law. If the objective of the Council is based on
an undened term, there is high probability that the Council will not
meet the expectations of the law.
Section 5.(i) adoption of any innovations and use of technology
in providing micro nance services;
The above implies that it will be the job of the Council to develop
new technologies and innovations, instead of allowing the industry to
16do so. This will be a strong demotivating factor for the industry to
introduce new products and services, since these will not be allowed to
be operationalised till the Council deems it t. On the other hand, the
Council itself gains little from the adoption of innovation, particularly
if they have to rst understand the implicit risk and rewards of these
innovations. Typically, the Council will have little incentive to drive
innovations, and this will slow down the development of the industry.
This provision is also contrary to what is standard in most other in-
dustries where the innovation and technology comes from within the
industry, and the role of the government is limited to ensuring that
such innovation and technology is not harmful.
Section 10. no micro nance institution shall commence or carry
on the activity of providing micro nance services without
obtaining a certicate of registration from the Reserve Bank
under this Act.
The lack of clarity in the denition of micro-nance services makes the
licensing requirements vague. Moreover, the term mfi is redundant as
it does not explain the nature of the entities which require licensing. If
this is left open to interpretation, almost any entity providing nancial
services would be enumerated within this denition.
Section 11.(3) Any company registered as a non-banking nance
company with the Reserve Bank of India under the provisions
of chapter III-B of the Reserve Bank of India, 1934, and
engaged in the activity of extending micro nance services
shall also apply for registration as a micro nance institution
under this Act.
The vague denition of micro-nance services also adds ambiguity to
this provision. Since no denition of micro-credit has been made, tech-
nically all Non-Banking Financial Companies (nbfcs) providing credit
facilities could be required to registered.
For example, if nbfcs provide credit worth Rs.20,000 per customer,
does such an nbfc have to register as an mfi? This act does not
inform nbfcs, with any certainty, whether it applies to them or not.
This regulatory vagueness will cause considerable disruption in both
the mfi and the nbfc industry.
Section 12.(1)(b) the applicant is engaged in the promotion and
development of nancial inclusion by providing micro nance
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This provision is in contradiction to Section 11.(1). While Section
11.(1) requires an mfi to apply before starting business, Section 12.(1)(b)
requires the company to be engaged in providing micro-nance services.
If the company is already engaged in micro-nance services, then it is
in violation of section 11.(1).
Secondly, the term promotion and development of nancial inclusion
is not very clear. It must be accepted that most for-prot mfis have a
business focus in nding protable customers who are risky, but willing
to pay higher rates for nancial services, rather than in promoting
nancial inclusion. It is in the objective function of the government
to promote nancial inclusion. We must acknowledge and accept that
nancial inclusion is a positive by-product of the action of the for-prot
mfis.
Section 15.(1) ... which becomes systemically important insti-
tutions micro nance institution shall convert its institution
into a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956
with or without a licence under section 25 of the Companies
Act, 1956,
This provision requires that an mfi which is a co-operative, must turn
itself into a company on being declared systemically important. Such
a provision regulates the behaviour of co-operatives. Co-operatives are
a subject of state regulation under the Constitution. Requiring a co-
operative to change its character impinges on the federal structure of
the Constitution. Therefore this provision will not be applicable to
mfis structured as co-operatives.
The term systemically and systematically has been used interchange-
ably in the section. There is no denition of the word systematically.
Section 16.(1) Appeal against certain cases
The right of an mfi to appeal against decisions, regarding the applica-
tion for a certicate of registration or the cancellation of the certicate,
has been extremely curtailed. Only the decision of denial of the certi-
cate, or an order to close down the business, can be appealed against.
For example, no mfi can appeal against a decision by the rbi declaring
it to be systemically important.
Such limited right of appeal is not conducive to rule of law. In com-
parison, any entity which is aggrieved by any order of the Securities
18and Exchanges Board of India (SEBI) has the right to appeal to the
Securities Appellate Tribunal.
Section 17.(1) Obligation to create reserve fund
There is no explanation in the Bill as to why a reserve fund ought to
be created by mfis. There is no explanation for the purposes for which
such fund will be used. Even a broad dention of the use of these
reserve funds has not been specied.
Section 21.(3) The expenses of, or incidental to, the audit speci-
ed in the order made by the Reserve Bank under Clause (a)
of section 20 shall be borne by the micro nance institution
concerned.
This provision raises the following question: When the special auditors
report shows no dierence from the normal auditing of the mfi, should
the mfi be liable to pay for the audit?
There is no doubt that when the auditor report unearths facts which
have been hidden by the mfi, the mfi should not only pay for the
report but be liable for other criminal or civil penalties. However, this
provision can be used to victimise a mfi. When the report shows that
the mfi had been honest, it should be the liability of the rbi to pay
for such audits. This will be a more fair distribution of the liability to
pay for special audits.
Section 23 ... for the purpose of promoting nancial of Reserve
inclusion.
(a) formulating and facilitating appropriate policy for the or-
derly growth of the micro nance services provided by micro
nance institutions so as to ensure greater transparency, ef-
fective management, good governance and to facilitate the
ow of micro nance services in an ecient manner;
(b) ... model codes for conduct of business of micro nance
institutions
If it is the duty of the rbi to formulate and facilitate the growth of
the micro-nance industry for the purpose of promoting nancial in-
clusion, then why is the Micro Finance Development Council (proposed
in Chapter II) required to advise the Central Government in matters of
policy for promoting nancial inclusion, as proposed in Section 5.(iv)?
If the rbi will formulate policy for nancial inclusion, then the Council
19should advise the rbi, and not the Central Government.
On the other hand, if the Central Government formulates policy for
nancial inclusion, and the rbi is an implementing body, then the rbi
ought not to have power to formulate policy.
If both entities (the rbi and the Central Government) formulate poli-
cies, contradictions will be inevitable. From a reading of Section 23 and
Section 5, there seems to be signicant overlap between the functions
of the rbi and the Central Government with the Council. This overlap
can have four possible outcomes:
1. Either the policy formulation by the Central Government with the
Council, or that of the Reserve Bank policy, will become redun-
dant. One entity will have a statutory mandate but not any work,
which will lead to a waste of resources.
2. Each body will think that the formulation of policy is the work of
the other, and will continually shift responsibility.
3. Both bodies will form the same policy, thus will lead to the dupli-
cation of work without any advantages.
4. Both bodies will form dierent policies, which will then lead to
contradictions and disputes, and will leave the micro-nance in-
dustry with contradictory signals on the development in the sector.
Section 24.(1) ... making of proper provision for bad and doubt-
ful debts, capital adequacy based on risk weights for assets
and credit conversion factors for o-balance-sheet items and
also relating to deployment of funds by a micro nance in-
stitution or a class of micro nance institutions or micro
nance institutions ... shall be bound to follow the policy so
determined and the directions so issued.
Such a system of provisioning and risk weights are applicable to banks,
which take deposits and make advances against them, with the clear
objective to protect the depositors of the bank. It is in the interest of
banks to earn maximum margins from loans, excessive levels of margins
also increase the risk of repayment failure. This puts the depositors
money at risk. Risk weights and provisioning norms are put in place
to counterbalance this behaviour of banks.
Since almost no mfi makes advanaces against deposits, it is not clear
what role of such norms plays. If any mfi is taking deposits against
20which it makes loans, then it should ideally register itself under the
banking regulation laws. If this Bill allows mfis to collect deposits and
make advances against them, then it will become a parallel Banking
Regulation Act. This would lead to problems of regulatory arbitrage
between banks and mfis, which would harm both the micro-nance
and the banking industry.
Section 24.(2)(h) observe Code of Conduct formulated by any
Self-Regulatory Organisation of micro nance institutions rec-
ognized by the Reserve Bank and set up grievance redressal
mechanism for their clients as required by the self-regulatory
organisation;
This is in contradiction with provisions stated in Sections 5 and 23.
Section 5 implies that the Central Government will formulate policies
for grievance redressal while Section 23 implies such policy formulation
and implementation will be formulated by the rbi for codes of conduct
(Section 23.(b)). The present provision implies that Self-Regulatory
Organisations (sros) of mfis will provide for code of conduct. There
is an urgent need to clarify who will develop the code of conduct and
mechanisms to redress grievances that have ben proposed in the Bill.
Section 25.(1) 1) A micro nance institution engaged in the ac-
tivity of granting nancial assistance to eligible clients shall
maintain the percentage of margin as may be specied by the
Reserve Bank by regulations from time to time.
The specication of margin by the rbi may have signicant competition
law issues. The above statement would standardise the returns and
rates that an mfi may charge, irrespective of their source of funding.
This would encourage collusive behaviour among mfis.
Section 27 No micro nance institution providing micro nance
services or other services, shall close or wind up its business,
or amalgamate with other institutions, or take over any other
business or its shareholding or de- merge or divide, or re-
structure, or otherwise transfer the ownership or control of
its business without prior approval of the Reserve Bank.
If an mfi is not taking deposits, or has any dues to any creditor, it is not
obvious why shutting down of the business should require regulatory
approval. It is not clear whether this section applies only to the business
of micro-nance, or to other services carried out by an mfi, as well. An
mfi could provide non-nancial services like sale of fertilisers or farming
21implements. There seems to be no legal reason to require permission
to close down such services.
More importantly, the Bill clearly extends its ambit outside its stated
objective to regulate the micro-nance industry, by controlling other
services.
Section 28.(1) ... may le an application for winding up or any
other application by whatever name called,
This provision raises the following question: Can the rbi le an applica-
tion for amalgamation or compromise of the mfi? This provision would
give the rbi wider powers than originally allowed under bankruptcy and
winding-up proceedings.
Section 30.(1)(a) all Government grants received and fees payable
under this Act;
If all the fees payable under this Bill is given to the Micro-Finance
Development Fund, then there will be an additional burden on the
Central Government to fund the Micro-nance Development Council
and the State Advisory Councils. The cost of employing persons inside
the rbi to monitor mfis, draft regulations, scrutinise applications, carry
out investigations, defend appeals, set up an ombudsman scheme, etc.,
will have to be borne by the rbi.
By putting all the fees collected under this Act into the Development
Fund, the nancial costs of the Central Government and the rbi to
regulate the industry will have to be collected from general taxes, which
is unfair to the entire nation. Further, such a move could result in one
of two outcomes:
1. The Central Government and the rbi will have to expend their
own resources (from other sources) to subsidise these activities of
regulation of the micro-nance industry.
2. These activities will remain underfunded and not fully carried out.
Section 30.(3)(a,c) to provide loans, renance, grant, seed cap-
ital or any other nancial assistance to any micro nance
institution or any other agency which the Reserve Bank may
by regulations specify;
to invest in equity or any other form of capital or quasi-equity
of a micro nance institution or any other agency on such
terms and conditions as may be specied by regulations;
22This provision would create many conicts of interest. It is a well-
known principle of public administration that the owner of a business
cannot be an eective regulator of the business. If the rbi makes ad-
vances to the mfis through the Micro-Finance Development Fund, it
will end up being an investor in some mfis. This would create prob-
lems because the interests of a manager/investor is to maximise prots,
which contradicts the interests of the regulator.
A large number of steps have been taken by the rbi to divest its owner-
ship of public sector banks to remove these conicts of interest. Today,
the rbi makes no advances or assistance to the public sector banks.
This is seen as a cornerstone of good regulatory policy where the reg-
ulator treats government and private owned entities similarly. If this
development is undone, it would be detrimental to the development of
the nancial sector in India.
Section 30.(3)(f) to meet any other expenses (except salaries,
allowances and other remuneration of ocers and other em-
ployees) of the Reserve Bank in connection with discharge of
its functions ...
A clear implication of this Bill is that the role of the regulators will
increase greatly. The rbi will have to appoint ocers and other persons
to carry out functions mandated under the Bill. It is patently unfair to
not allow such expenses to be recouped from the fees collected under
this Bill.
This is also contrary to the structure and processes at other Indian
nancial regulators. Both the SEBI and the Insurance Regulatory and
Development Authority (IRDA) are funded by fees that they collect,
to cover their costs, including salaries and other expenses.
Section 31.(1) The Reserve Bank may, in consultation with the
Micro Finance Development Council and the State Advisory
Councils , if deemed necessary, appoint as many Micro Fi-
nance Ombudsmen as it may deem t in accordance with a
scheme framed under this section,
Section 5 stated that the Central Government, with the advice of the
Council, will form policies for redressing grievances. Later in Section
24.(h), this power was granted to sros of mfis recognised by the rbi.
Here, the policy is being laid down in the form of an Ombudsman
23mechanism. This would make the previous statements redundant as
any other policy, which is not the Ombudsman mechanism, would be
contrary to the law, or at least not as enforceable as the Ombudsman
system envisioned in the Bill and sanctioned by the Parliament. The
Bill should choose a single mechanism, rather than provide for three
potentially contradictory mechanisms.
Section 32.(1) (1) If any provision of this Act is contravened or if
any default is made in complying with any other requirement
of this Act or of any rules, regulations or orders or directions
given or notication issued or condition imposed thereunder
... or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years
or with both.
This provision raises the question of whether all provisions of the Bill
should be considered to have criminal consequences.
For example, if the Member of the Development or Advisory Councils
exceeds his term as specied in Section 6 and 9, should they be liable to
be imprisoned for two years? Moreover, whether an action is criminal
or not, is usually laid down by Parliament alone. This is because crimi-
nal liabilities takes away the fundamental rights of a person. Therefore,
all actions which are criminal are mentioned in the parent legislation.
Regulatory authorities do not have the right to imprison persons solely
for the violation of regulations. The present provision makes violations
of orders and directions, a criminal oence, with consequent imprison-
ment. The government should reconsider limiting criminal violations
to specied sections of the Bill.
Section 32.(2) Whoever knowingly fails to comply with the pro-
visions of section 12 or any orders made by the Central Gov-
ernment or other specied authority under section 13 or the
directions issued by the Micro Finance Ombudsman shall be
punishable with ne
This provision seems to be a repetition of Section 32.(1). It is also not
clear what provisions of this Bill provide for the Central Government to
issue orders to a person. More importantly, the violation of the orders
of an Ombudsman generally harms the consumer/ client. Yet, because
the ne will be collected by the Central Government, a customer who
follows up on a case with an ombudsman will be worse o. While a
non-compliance ne may force the mfi to act, there is no system dened
for compensation, or transfer of nes, to the customer who is actually
24harmed under the regulations.
Section 33 ... with further ne, which may extend to ten thou-
sand rupees for everyday after the rst, during which the con-
travention or default continues ...
It is unclear how wilfully misleading the rbi can be a continuing oence.
Should the ne be calculated from the time that such misleading was
started till it is uncovered? It would be very dicult to prosecute
for such oences, without a clear explanation of how such oences are
considered to be continuing.
Section 37.(1) No court shall take cognizance of any oence pun-
ishable under this Act or any rules or regulations made there
under, save on a complaint made by an ocer or other per-
son authorised by the Reserve Bank.
Section 37.(1) is in apparent conict with 32.(3) which makes all of-
fences for thrift to be cognisable. It is not clear whether the consumer
may approach the course for the violation of thrift. It must be pointed
out that any violation of acceptance, or payment, of thrift aects de-
positors to a large extent. It will be depositors who will be the rst to
be informed of such violation. If such depositors are denied the right
to make criminal complaints, criminal investigation could be delayed.
It is also unfair to not allow depositors to prosecute for criminal acts
since they are the ones who lose their savings under such fraud.
Section 38.(1) The Reserve Bank may with the previous approval
of the Central Government delegate any of its powers con-
ferred under this Act to the National Bank in respect of any
micro nance institution or a class of micro nance insti-
tutions generally, by issue of a notication in the Ocial
Gazette.
This provision goes against the principle of Delegata potestas non potest
delegari which means that a responsibility delegated to one entity
should not be further delegated by that entity.
It is optimal that the parent legislation (in this case, the Bill) identify
the body which will carry out the regulatory functions. It will become
very dicult for the government to hold a regulator responsible for
performance or lapses, if further delegation is made. It also creates
confusion as to whether the National Bank should follow the parent
legislation or the instruction from the rbi.
25Secondly, the National Bank itself is a major player in the micro-lending
industry through its sponsored institutions. This would create the same
problem of the owner of the business being the regulator of the business
as pointed out in the commentary for Section 30.(c)
Section 39 In the event of a micro nance institution making any
default in repayment of thrift to any of its members or eligi-
ble clients who had made a contribution to thrift, all members
or eligible clients of such micro nance institution shall have
a rst charge over the specied unencumbered securities re-
ferred to in sub-section (3) of section 18.
Section 18 does not have any subsections. This probably refers to
Section 17. However, it is not clear whether this overrules the general
and special bankruptcy laws of the nation.
Section 41 The Central Government may, on being satised that
exempt. in the public interest, or in the interest of the micro
nance institution, it is necessary so to do, by an order pub-
lished in the Ocial Gazette, declare that any or all of the
provisions of this Act shall not apply to a micro nance insti-
tution or a class of micro nance institutions, either gener-
ally or for such period as may be specied in the order, subject
to such conditions, limitations or restrictions as it may deem
t to impose.
This is, in eect, a Henry VIII clause. This eectively gives power to the
Central Government to modify this Act with respect to certain entities.
It has the potential to be abused to create exceptions for government-
owned entities. This would not only make the eld of micro-nance
uneven for participants, but could also lead to serious regulatory lapses.
Moreover, such a clause makes the Central Government superior to the
expression of Parliament, which is against the concept of democracy.
Section 42 Explanation: For removal of doubts it is declared that
micro nance services extended by any micro nance institu-
tion registered with the Reserve Bank shall not be treated as
money-lender for the purpose of any State enactments relat-
ing to money-lenders and usurious loans.
The present constitutional structure in India does not allow a central
legislation to override matters of state legislation. This exception may
be given to banks, which are a part of the central legislative matters.
If the nature of the business carried out by micro-nance companies is
26essentially money lending, then the state legislation regarding money
lending will apply. Such overriding of federal structure cannot be done
in a central legislation and, more so, in an explanation. The consti-
tutionality of such provisions are highly suspect. It is dangerous to
attempt to subvert the constitutional separation of subjects.
Section 44.(2)(v) the maximum amount of thrift that can be col-
lected from each individual client, creation of free reserves in
unencumbered securities and any other measures for protect-
ing the interest of the clients keeping thrift with the micro
nance institutions;
This provision is confusing because the Bill mandates each mfi to create
a reserve fund in Section 17, where the reserve fund is regulated by the
rbi. In the current provision, the power to regulate the reserve fund
is being given to the Central Government. This raises the question of
whether this is a separate fund or the same fund as the one mentioned
in Section 17? If the latter is true, then this is another instance of
regulatory overlap. It is important that the miscellaneous powers do
not overlap in the Bill.
Section 44.(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 45-
S of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 the Rules prescribed
under clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 44 may permit
acceptance of thrift by micro nance institutions subject to
such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.
The power of the mfis to accept thrift should be stated in the part
regarding thrift, and such provision should overrule the powers of other
Acts.
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